Declining fertility and mortality rates in the second half of the twentieth century have led to the twenty-first century being characterised as the century of the aging population. Concurrently, the decline in the numbers of young people entering the labour force is exacerbating the problems arising from the aging population. Implications of these trends are analysed for a variety of Asian countries. Labour force growth in India and Pakistan will be sufficient to compensate for the shrinking labour forces in Europe and Asia excluding the massive fall in China; outsourcing labour to South Asia will be an increasing trend in the twenty-first century. The Asian countries with less problematic demographic structures are instead facing economic challenges and require education and training to improve labour productivity.
Introduction
From the demographic perspective, the twentyfirst century is defined as the century of the ageing population. This phenomenon is well underway in all Asian countries as a result of the spectacular falls in both total fertility and mortality rates in the second half of the twentieth century.
The Background: Demographic Change in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century
As early as the 1950s, both Japan and India had policies in place to lower the fertility rate. In 1958, an influential book titled Population growth and economic development in low-income countries: a case study of India's prospects by demographer Ansley J. Coale and economist Edgar M. Hoover argued that economic development in Asian countries was constrained by high levels of fertility (Coale & Hoover 1958) . At the time a large portion of available capital-at both the national and the household level-was devoted to the care and nurture of the 40 per cent of the population aged less than 15 years. Fewer children, they argued, would provide the opportunity for more productive investment of capital and enable a stronger focus on developing human capital among the next generation of workers, both essential features of economic development. In more recent times, the argument of Coale and Hoover has become known as the 'demographic dividend' whereby, with a fall in the birth rate, the population concentrates in the working ages, thus providing a 'dividend' to the economy.
Interestingly, two senior American demographers and strong proponents of this approach, Warren Thompson and Frank Lorimer, worked with the McArthur administration in Japan. Thompson had argued since the 1920s that rapid population growth in Asian countries was an obstacle to development and a potential source of insecurity (Thompson 1929) . Within the McArthur administration, Thompson advocated for lower fertility in Japan. Lorimer was part of the same group of demographers as Coale at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University. Between 1944 and 1958 , the argument against rapid population growth was made in a remarkable collection of books stimulated by the Office of Population Research (Barclay 1954 , Davis 1951 , Kirk 1946 , Lorimer 1946 , Moore 1945 , Notestein et al. 1944 , Smith 1952 , Taeuber 1958 .
In the Cold War context, the Princeton demographers were able to influence the United States government to support the provision and distribution of contraceptives in developing countries in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, nationals were trained in the United States on how to run family planning programs.
In 1967, 30 heads of governments in developing countries signed a Declaration on Population, strikingly worded as follows:
As heads of governments actively concerned with the population problem, we share these convictions: We believe that the population problem must be recognised as a principal element in long-range national planning if governments are to achieve their economic goals and fulfil the aspirations of their people. We believe that the great majority of parents desire to have the knowledge and the means to plan their families; that the opportunity to decide the number and spacing of children is a basic human right. We believe that lasting and meaningful peace will depend to a considerable measure upon how the challenge of population growth is met. We believe the objective of family planning is the enrichment of human life, not its restriction; that family planning, by assuring greater opportunity to each person, frees man to attain his individual dignity and reach his full potential (Ayala & Caradon 1968: 3) .
While the idea of development through fertility control was conceptualised as a support to capitalism, it was also the central rationale of China's one-child policy. Consequently, demographic change in China and Vietnam over the past 50 years, in broad terms, has mirrored demographic change in the other countries of Asia.
Variation in Demographic Change in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century
While all Asian countries have experienced falls in fertility and mortality in the past 60 years, this does not mean that their demographic situations today, or in the future, are the same. The key issue is the impact of past fertility trends upon the current and future age structure of the population. As described by the demographic dividend argument, age structure is affected strongly by falling fertility and, as I have described, change in the age structure was and, for some countries, continues to be a rationale for fertility decline (the demographic dividend argument). Changes in mortality have a much smaller impact on the shape of age distributions but, in recent times, increased survival above age 60 has 'filled out' the older ages more than would otherwise have been the case.
Fertility
Over the past 60 years, the countries of Asia differ substantially in their levels of fertility decline and also importantly, the speed of their fertility declines. Both the level of decline and the speed of the decline affect the age structure; the more that fertility has declined and the more rapidly that fertility has declined, the faster and more severe the ageing of the population will be.
The total fertility rate (TFR) is a conventional way of measuring fertility trends. It is the average number of children that a group of women would have in their lifetime given the age-specific fertility rates that applied in the specific time period to which the measure applies. The measure can be affected by changing in the timing of births, particularly the timing of the first birth. A shift to earlier first births will cause a temporal rise in the TFR; a shift to later first births will cause a temporal decline in the TFR. The Republic of Korea, for example, has experienced a substantial delay in the timing of the first birth over the past 20 years, and so its TFR may be artificially (temporarily) lower than its longer term trend value. Figure 1 shows that all but two of the 14 countries, Japan and Australia, had high fertility of between five and eight births per woman in the early 1950s. By 2005-2010, only two countries, the Philippines and Pakistan, had a TFR above three and, in both these cases, fertility was trending downwards strongly indicating that fertility will soon be below three in these countries as well. Evidently, the campaign to reduce fertility rates in Asia has been remarkably successful. The graphs show that most of the change took place after 1970. If the world's population growth had remained constant from 1970 to 2014, today the global population would be 12.1 billion. In what should be recognised as one of the most important changes in human history, increasing control over fertility, in just over 40 years, has reduced the world's potential population by five billion in just over 40 years. It has also been argued that, in Asia, this increasing control over fertility did indeed contribute strongly to the favourable development outcomes predicted by Coale and Hoover in countries such as Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and China (Bloom & Williamson 1998) .
However, the speed and timing of the fertility declines have varied across countries. In India, the decline started in the early 1960s but has proceeded slowly. On the other end of the spectrum, the decline in Iran started in the mid-1980s but was spectacularly fast, with the TFR falling from around seven to two in just 15 years. 1 China's fall was also very fast in the years prior to the one-child policy-from a TFR of six in the mid-1960s to a TFR of three at the end of the 1970s. South Korea and Singapore also experienced rapid and relatively early declines with Singapore reaching the replacement level of two children per woman in the 1970s and South Korea in the 1980s. Generally, the falls in the Southeast Asian countries proceeded more slowly than in the East Asian countries with Thailand being on the faster end and the Philippines on the slower end. Indonesia's fertility, dominated by a relatively low fertility in Java, was the lowest of all of the countries (except Japan and Australia) in [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] . This is disregarding the temporarily low fertility in South Korea and Vietnam, both of which were affected in the early 1950s by war. From this only moderately high level, Indonesia's fertility decline has proceeded relatively slowly and may have ceased falling over the last decade at a level still above the replacement level.
Two totally unrelated countries, Bangladesh and Vietnam, display very similar fertility trends falling from very high levels in the 1970s to low levels by the end of the period. Finally, Pakistan has been a late starter with fertility not falling until the 1990s but, since then, the decline has been strong. Japan and Australia had similar levels of fertility in the early 1950s as the fertility trends of the two countries crossed with Australia's fertility rising and Japan's falling. Japan's fertility fell quickly to replacement level by the end of the 1950s, but Australia's fertility remained comparatively high until the mid-1970s (the baby boom years). For the past 40 years, Australia's fertility rate has been almost flat fluctuating between 2.0 and 1.7 births per woman, and it is now around 1.9 births per woman.
Almost unseen on these charts, but highly significant, is the fact that in five of these countries (Japan, South Korea, China, Singapore and Thailand) the fertility rate now sits at very low levels of under 1.5 births per woman. Fertility rates of fewer than 1.5 births per woman lead to substantial and rapid falls in the child population. This is then followed 20 years later by similar falls in the young working ages. At the same time, the formerly high fertility rates in previous years produce large increases in the population at older ages. The more rapidly Figure 1 Total Fertility Rates, 1950 -1955 to 2005 -2010 Countries that fertility fell in the past and the higher the level from which it fell, the more severe will be the extent of population ageing in the future.
The advocates of fertility decline in the 1950s and 1960s envisaged fertility falling to the replacement level and remaining at that level far into the future. Except for small increases in population due to gradually falling mortality rates, replacement level fertility would mean zero population growth and constant age structures. This was the result predicted by 'demographic transition theory' as propounded by Kingsley Davis in 1945. That fertility would continue to fall to levels well below the replacement level was never on the radar of 1950s population planners. In the short term, very low fertility increases GDP per capita because of the reduced costs associated with fewer children. In the intermediate term, however, the size of the labour force falls and, along with the wider population, ages dramatically. In the longer term, the population size spirals downwards. All of these trends provide a potential threat to the health of economies with the problems facing the Japanese economy, for instance, sometimes being attributed to a 'demographic malaise'.
Mortality
While it is these trends in fertility rates that have the dominant effect upon age structures and population growth, the increases in life expectancy have been equally spectacular (  Figure 2 ). From 1950 to 1955, Australia was the only country of the 14 studied in which life expectancy at birth exceeded 65 years. By 2005-2010, however, all countries had achieved this level. This was achieved initially through the eradication of deaths from infectious diseases and, more recently, through control of degenerative diseases, especially heart conditions. Today, Japanese women and Australian men occupy the number one global ranking in life expectancy for their respective sexes. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 2 , life expectancy figures in all other countries have increased substantially. The gap in life expectancy between the highest and lowest countries in 1950-1955 was 35 years; now, it is just 15 years. While increases in life expectancy contribute to the ageing of the population, more important is that people are living healthier lives for longer. This enables them to contribute more productively to the labour force at all ages, especially older ages. With increases in standards of living, healthier life styles and medical advances, we can expect that life expectancy will continue to increase in the future.
Population Ageing
With average life expectancy on the rise, now more than 50 per cent of people will live beyond the age of 80 years. This will result in countries facing substantial increases in the demand for aged care and health services as well as income support for older people. This is a considerable problem for those countries where ageing is occurring rapidly in the absence of policy and programs to address these challenges. The speed of ageing is depicted in Figure 3 . Projected changes in the age structures of individual countries between 2010 and 2060 are shown in Appendix 1. Figure 3 shows that, in 1990, the percentage of the population aged 65 years and over was highest in Australia and Japan, with each having around 11 per cent of their populations in this age group. By 2050, however, Japan's proportion in the older ages is predicted to increase to 40 per cent, while Australia's percentage will only rise to 24 per cent. While being much younger than Australia in 1990, by 2050, the populations of Vietnam and Thailand are predicted to be equally as old as Australia. Populations in Singapore, China and the Republic of Korea will be even older again. These five countries are all countries where fertility fell very rapidly and, aside from Vietnam, all now have fertility rates below 1.5 births per woman. Appendix 1 shows that Japan and these five countries all have 'undercut' age distributions with more people at older ages than at younger ages. This is a situation that leads to population decline with fairly substantial declines projected for China, Japan and South Korea.
As regards aged care, health needs and income support for older persons, Australia and Japan have had many years to develop policies. Australia has had an aged pension for over 100 years, and its ageing process has been, and will continue to be, gradual compared with other Asian countries (Figure 4 ). Australia's four successive intergenerational reports have presented population ageing as a substantial fiscal challenge facing the Australian government, but it is a far lesser challenge than that faced by the other 13 countries shown in Figure 3 . For Japan, the problem is more challenging because their population will be a lot older than Australia's. Singapore has policies for an ageing population in place but also faces a larger problem than Australia because of its extremely low birth rate.
For the other 11 countries, aged care and income support policy is, at best, in an embryonic state, and the health system is not well prepared to deal with the requirements of elder generations. All these countries have a history of support for older people being provided by families and, consequently, face difficulty in moving to a system of public support or some combination of family and public support. In the present environment of much smaller family sizes and family members living at a distance from the older person, old age support is haphazard. Because of the rapidity of their fertility declines, this problem is at its greatest in China, South Korea and Thailand. For Thailand and China in particular, the problem is exacerbated by the movement of young people from villages to cities, which results in hyper-ageing in rural areas where facilities are basic and, because of the dispersed population, services are difficult to provide. These issues have been addressed in summary reports on China (Cai et al. 2012 ) and Thailand (Knodel & Chayovan 2008 
Labour Supply
Combined with the ageing Asian population issue is the concerning decline in the number of young people entering the labour force. Again, this will be a greater problem for those countries that have experienced a more rapid and substantial birth rate decline. Figure 5 shows the ratio between the predicted numbers of 15-to 24-year-olds in 2050 and those in 2010. China's ratio is 0.57, meaning that the number aged 15-24 in 2050 (139 million people) will be 43 per cent lower than the number in 2010 (242 million people), a total fall of over 100 million people of labour force entry age. As shown in Appendix 1, in 2050, the number of 70-to 74-year-olds in China will be larger than in any other age group with numbers predicted to taper down across all labour force ages. So, not only will the labour force in China be much smaller; it will also be much older.
For seven of the 14 countries, the decrease in the population of labour force entry age will be more than 20 per cent, with Thailand and Vietnam expected to experience similar decreases to China. The fall will not be as large in Japan, between 2010 and 2050, as the ratio has already been in decline since 1970. It can be argued that Japan has already felt the pressure of a falling labour supply at the younger ages. There is a growing viewpoint that younger and older workers in today's economies are complementary rather than substitutes. When technology is changing rapidly, it is the younger more recently educated generation that is the assimilator of the new technology. Older workers, on the other hand, are able to apply management experience to a greater degree (McDonald & Temple 2006) . Thus, the pace of innovation and adoption of new technology is likely to be faster where the number of younger workers is balanced with the number of older workers. Singapore is predicted to maintain its numbers in the 15-24 age bracket over the next 40 years despite its history of very low fertility. This is because Singapore has The ratio in Figure 5 is close to 1.0 for India and Indonesia. In these two countries, the population aged 15-24 is expected to peak in 2020 and 2025, respectively. Provided that their young people are well educated, India and Indonesia should have a labour supply advantage over the next 40 years compared with most other Asian countries. In the Philippines, the population aged 15-24 will be 35 per cent larger in 2050 than in 2010. We can therefore expect that the Philippines will continue to be a major supplier of labour around the globe. Finally, with a 44 per cent increase in the population aged 15-24 predicted from 2010 to 2050, Australia stands out as the country with a growing supply of young workers. This is due to its fertility rate, which has continued to remain close to the replacement level and its immigration program.
A central feature of Asia's predicted labour force figures is that all future jobs will be in urban areas and employment and population in rural areas is likely to decline. Job growth will be concentrated in ever-mega cities like Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, Dacca, Tehran, Beijing and Shanghai, as well as other large cities in China and India. Singapore, Melbourne and Sydney, while not qualifying as mega-cities (with populations of at least 10 million people), will continue to grow strongly so long as immigration is maintained.
Population and Labour Supply Futures in Asia and Their Implications for Australia
The aforementioned discussion and the age structures shown in Appendix 1 enable some speculation about population and labour supply futures for these Asian countries and, even more speculatively, the implications for Australia.
Japan
Japan has had very low fertility for about 25 years and close to zero migration. Consequently, it has already experienced a considerable level of ageing, especially within its labour force. Over the same 25-year period, the economy of Japan has languished and the level of government debt has risen considerably. While Japan has adopted relatively successful policies to deal with its aged population, further ageing will only present more fiscal challenges. Japan has attempted to raise its fertility rate but only a small rise is evident in the most recent years. It is generally agreed that countries with very low fertility rates are countries where the capacity for women to combine work and family is low (McDonald 2000; Luci-Greulich & Thevenon 2013) . This is almost certainly the reason for Japan's persistently low fertility. Working hours are very long, child care is difficult to obtain and men provide very little assistance in household work. Currently, there are positives for Japan's economy, such as its large cohort of 40-to 44-year-olds as well as its highly educated labour force. However, in coming years, the size of its labour force will fall year upon year and its age will increase considerably (Appendix 1). Thus, the challenges ahead for the Japanese economy are probably greater than has been the case in the past two decades. As yet there is little sign that Japan will adopt a large migration program to mitigate the fall in its labour supply. To have any noticeable effect, the level of migration would have to be very large.
China
Most demographers inside and outside of China consider that the country held on to the onechild policy for far too long. Demographers also consider that the 2015 replacement of the one-child policy by a two-child policy will not result in longer-term fertility increase in China. Demographers have estimated that China's fertility rate has been at or below 1.5 births per woman for 20 years, but official figures for China have shown higher levels. Appendix 1 shows that China will face massive falls in its labour supply at the same time as it will experience rapid population ageing. Policies for an aged population are not well developed, and additional challenges arise through the movement of younger people to the industrial areas in the east. This 'floating population' numbers 150-200 million people. The hukou system of population registration prevents older generations from moving to where their adult children are working. And, while many older people receive remittances from their working children, the system of family support can be haphazard. Public support programs will be expensive and are also needed at a time when China's public debt is rising. The falling labour supply presents an even greater challenge-particularly as the Wittgenstein projections in Appendix 1 do not display major improvements in the education levels of younger Chinese workers. As with any other large population, immigration cannot be a solution to these labour shortages. China may need to consider investing in other countries that will have large labour supplies such as India, Indonesia or some Sub-Saharan African countries.
South Korea
In comparison with Japan and China, the demographic situation is somewhat better in the Republic of Korea as low fertility is a relatively recent development. There is still a prospect that South Korea can reverse its fertility decline through a government-designed policy package, although its effectiveness in improving women's employment has been questioned (Lee & Baek 2014) . The Wittgenstein projections also show considerable improvements in the education levels of South Korea's working age population over coming years. This will tend to keep the growth rate of labour productivity relatively high. Furthermore, the health system in South Korea is well developed, and various income support programs, including the National Pension, are available to a majority of the aged population (Park 2011). As the population ages, however, these income support programs will be brought under increasing pressure. This has been addressed by reducing the replacement rate of the National Pension.
Singapore
Fertility has been below 1.5 births per woman in Singapore for about 20 years. However, unlike other countries with very low fertility, Singapore has addressed this demographic problem through large-scale immigration. This is a good solution for a small country as the number of migrants involved is reasonable. Nevertheless, the Singapore Government's White Paper on Population, published in 2013, was met with considerable opposition from the general public because of their opposition to migration (National Population and Talent Division 2013) . It seems the SingaporeanChinese see themselves as culturally different from the migrant Chinese who make up the majority of the migrants. As Appendix 1 shows, persistently low fertility combined with large-scale immigration produces an oddly shaped age distribution by 2050. While the population becomes old, these numbers are continually offset by large numbers of immigrants. In such a situation, the population over time 'becomes the immigrants'. The White Paper proposes that only a small annual number of immigrants can become Singaporean citizens, but this will mean that the citizen population ages much more than does the non-citizen population. This is likely to be an unstable situation unless the fertility rate of the citizens rises in the future. The White Paper proposes a comprehensive family policy in an attempt to increase the fertility rate of Singapore's citizens. Nevertheless, in purely economic terms, supplementation of the labour force through immigration is basically effective.
Thailand and Vietnam
It is only very recently that the fertility rate in Thailand has dropped below 1.5 births per woman, and this may be a temporary phenomenon related to a trend towards later marriage. Nevertheless, the Thailand government has expressed concern about future ageing of the population, a declining labour supply and a shortage of skilled labour. The 11th development plan aims to stabilise the fertility rate at 1.6 through 'appropriate tax and child care assistance measures', but the plan is low on specifics (National Economic and Social Development Board 2012, p.50). More specific recommendations were made in a report published jointly by National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in 2010 (NESDB and UNFPA 2012) . According to the Wittgenstein projections, while the younger working age population will fall by 2060, the number of highly skilled workers will increase considerably. Thus, skill formation is an important policy direction for Thailand. The demographic future for Vietnam has some similarities with that of Thailand, and similar approaches are likely to be required. The Wittgenstein projections show a low level of tertiary education among Vietnamese in the future, and this would clearly need to be addressed if Vietnam is to compete in the technological future.
Iran
The issues for Iran are more economic than demographic, largely because of economic sanctions. The effect of lifting the sanctions remains to be seen, and the current low oil price is not helpful to Iran taking advantage of the lifting of the sanctions. So long as Iran's birth rate remains near the replacement level as seems likely (McDonald et al. 2015) , the only major demographic issue is a long way into the future when the huge baby boom cohort, now aged between 20 and 35, reach older ages. The Wittgenstein projections suggest large improvements in skill levels within the Iranian labour force from 2010 to 2060. 6.7. Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines are all projected to have a 'beehive'-shaped age structure by 2060. This is generally considered to be a favourable age structure with a relatively high concentration of population in the working ages. Again, the issues for these countries will be more economic than demographic with a strong need to improve labour productivity through education and training.
Pakistan
For Pakistan, with the highest level of fertility among the 14 countries, the central issue is the old problem of excessive population growth. Fortunately, most of the growth by predicted to have a huge growth in its working age population from 2010 to 2060. Certainly, with the exception of China, growth in the labour supplies of India and Pakistan are easily enough to compensate for the combined falls in labour force in the advanced countries of Asia and Europe. Outsourcing of jobs to South Asia will be a growing feature of twenty-firstcentury Asian economies.
Australia
Finally, what are the implications for Australia? On present trends, the Australian labour force will grow substantially over the first half of the twenty-first century, driven almost solely by immigration. Without immigration, the Australian labour force would be static from now. The Wittgenstein projections also show that the Australian labour force will be highly skilled by 2060, much more so than now. This provides opportunities for Australia in a technological century, especially in the export of services. Economic growth and increasing wealth across the more recent developers in Asia is likely to sustain demand for natural resources, especially iron ore, as construction continues in Asia's mega cities. Food exports will be another major source of export income for Australia as Asian economies develop and urbanise. All in all, this points to Australia diversifying its trade relations in Asia in the twenty-first century and reducing the reliance that it has upon a single customer.
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